

A few tools

Computing with remainders

Powering

Fermat and Euclid

RSA

Preparations

Encrypting and Decrypting

Security of RSA

Factorisation

Computing roots

Not proved!

Cryptography using Primes

Max Neunhöffer

University of St Andrews

20 June 2008

Computing with remainders

For $a, n \in \mathbb{Z}$ we can divide a with remainder by n :

$$a = q \cdot n + r, \quad \text{with } q, r \in \mathbb{Z},$$

such that $0 \leq r < n$.

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Note in particular: $a \equiv r \pmod{n}$.

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If $a \equiv \hat{a} \pmod{n}$ and $b \equiv \hat{b} \pmod{n}$, then

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Can we compute 123^{129} modulo 10 easily?

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$$\begin{aligned} 123^{129} &\equiv 3^{129} \equiv 3^{1+128} \equiv 3 \cdot 3^{(2^7)} \pmod{10} \\ &\equiv 3 \cdot ((((((3^2)^2)^2)^2)^2)^2)^2 \pmod{10} \end{aligned}$$

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Fermat and Euclid

Theorem (Little Theorem of Fermat)

Let $n = p \cdot q$ be the *product of two primes p and q* . Then

$$a^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

for all integers a *that are not divisible by p or q* .

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Theorem (Euclidean Algorithm)

If $d, m \in \mathbb{Z}$ *do not have a common prime divisor*, then it is *(efficiently) possible* to determine an $e \in \mathbb{Z}$, such that $de \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$.

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The RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptosystem:

If Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob:

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The RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptosystem:

If Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob:

- Bob **chooses** two primes p and q
- and **computes** $n = p \cdot q$ and $m = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.

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- He then publishes n and e

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- and computes an e , such that $de \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$.
- He then publishes n and e
- and keeps secret p , q , m and d .

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- He gets back $b \equiv c^d \equiv (a^e)^d \equiv a^{de} \equiv a \pmod{n}$
since $de \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$.

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If one knows p and q , one can compute m and d .

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If one knows p and q , one **can compute m and d** .

If one knows $m = (p-1)(q-1)$, then also p and q .

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Proof: $p + q = n + 1 - (pq - p - q + 1)$ and

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Knowing n **in principle** determines p and q !

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However, **actually computing** p and q from n is **HARD**.

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Computing roots and discrete logarithm

Public: n and e **Secret:** $p, q, m = (p-1)(q-1)$ and d

Cracking the encryption is basically solving the equation

$$x^e \equiv c \pmod{n}$$

that is, **computing e -th roots**.

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- **Then** $a \equiv z^x \pmod{n}$ since

$$a \equiv c^d \equiv w^{dx} \equiv (z^e)^{dx} \equiv (z^{ed})^x \equiv z^x \pmod{n}$$

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- **Then** $a \equiv z^x \pmod{n}$ since

$$a \equiv c^d \equiv w^{dx} \equiv (z^e)^{dx} \equiv (z^{ed})^x \equiv z^x \pmod{n}$$

However, **solving discrete logarithms** like $c = z^x$ is **HARD**.

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However: It is also not proved, that there is none!.